Universal Jurisdiction: The Promise of Global Justice and the Reality of Selective Accountability

By Adnan Nasir Khan
Adnan Nasir Khan is a human rights lawyer and an LL.M. Master of Advanced Studies student
in International Crimes, Justice and Human Rights at the Geneva Academy of International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland. He is an Advocate enrolled with the
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bar Council, Pakistan, and has professional experience in asylum and
humanitarian protection, human rights law, and legal research. His academic and professional
interests include international criminal law, universal jurisdiction, transitional justice, refugee
protection, and accountability for serious international crimes. He has participated in
international human rights programmes and initiatives in Geneva and Europe and has worked
with organisations engaged in refugee protection and international justice. His research focuses
particularly on the relationship between international accountability mechanisms and national
legal systems.
Email: adnan.khan@geneva-academy.ch

There is a powerful idea at the heart of international criminal law: some crimes are so grave that
they concern the international community as a whole. Genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes and torture are not simply ordinary offences committed in distant places. They attack
fundamental values shared across borders. Yet a difficult question follows from this principle:
who should prosecute these crimes when the State where they occurred is unwilling or
unable to do so?
One answer is universal jurisdiction.
Universal jurisdiction allows national courts, under certain domestic legal frameworks, to
prosecute individuals for particularly serious international crimes even when the crime was not
committed on their territory and neither the perpetrator nor the victim is necessarily a national of
that State. In theory, it offers an extraordinary response to the problem of impunity. A perpetrator
should not be able to escape accountability merely by crossing a border.
In practice, however, universal jurisdiction exposes one of the deepest contradictions of
international criminal justice. The law increasingly recognises a collective interest in prosecuting
international crimes, while the exercise of that jurisdiction remains dependent on national
political choices, prosecutorial priorities, available evidence and the presence of suspects within
particular territories.
The result is an uncomfortable question:
Is universal jurisdiction becoming a genuine mechanism of global justice, or is it gradually
becoming another form of selective accountability?
A jurisdiction without borders
The traditional foundations of criminal jurisdiction are relatively straightforward. A State
normally prosecutes crimes committed within its territory. It may also exercise jurisdiction over
its nationals or, in some circumstances, over crimes committed against its nationals abroad.
Universal jurisdiction is different. Its justification lies in the nature of the crime rather than in a
conventional territorial or personal connection.
The rationale is particularly compelling where international crimes are involved. If a person
accused of torture, genocide or crimes against humanity can avoid prosecution simply because
the territorial State is unwilling to investigate, territorial jurisdiction becomes an inadequate
answer to the problem of impunity.
The principle therefore attempts to close a legal gap: where the State with the strongest
territorial connection fails to act, another State may provide a forum for accountability.
The International Court of Justice's judgment in Belgium v Senegal illustrates an important
related principle. Interpreting the Convention against Torture, the Court held that Senegal was
required to submit Hissène Habré's case to its competent authorities for prosecution or extradite
him. The judgment reinforced the idea that serious international crimes cannot simply disappear
into a jurisdictional vacuum.
But universal jurisdiction should not be confused with a universal criminal court. There is no
single global prosecutor exercising it. Instead, national prosecutors and judges determine
whether a case will actually move forward.
That distinction is crucial.
Germany and the practical promise of universal jurisdiction
Perhaps the strongest contemporary illustration of universal jurisdiction comes from Europe,
particularly Germany.
German courts have prosecuted individuals accused of international crimes committed in Syria
despite the absence of a territorial connection between Germany and the alleged crimes. These
proceedings became particularly important because accountability at the international level has
faced significant obstacles.
In 2025, the Higher Regional Court in Frankfurt convicted a former Syrian military doctor, Alaa
M., of crimes against humanity, war crimes and murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
The case concerned torture, sexual violence and killings committed in the context of the Assad
regime's persecution of opponents.
This was not simply another domestic criminal trial. It demonstrated how national courts can
become instruments of international accountability when international institutions cannot reach
the situation directly.
Germany's experience also illustrates the evidentiary possibilities of universal jurisdiction. In
earlier Syrian cases, German courts relied on documentary material, witness testimony and
evidence originating from international investigative mechanisms. In the Al-Khatib proceedings,
for example, Germany's Federal Court of Justice confirmed the conviction of a former senior
Syrian intelligence officer and accepted the use of reports from the UN Independent International
Commission of Inquiry as documentary evidence.
These cases challenge the assumption that international criminal justice must always be
administered by an international tribunal.
Sometimes, the courtroom capable of delivering international justice is a domestic one.
But universal jurisdiction has a political problem
The promise of universal jurisdiction becomes more complicated when we consider how cases
are selected.
A national prosecutor does not have unlimited resources. Investigations into international crimes
are expensive, complicated and often dependent on evidence located thousands of kilometres
away. Witnesses may be displaced. Documents may have disappeared. Victims may fear
retaliation. Investigators may have difficulty establishing the chain of command necessary to
connect an individual suspect with an international crime.
Most importantly, prosecutors must decide which cases to prioritise.
This creates a paradox.
The principle of universal jurisdiction is based on the idea that international crimes concern
everyone. Its implementation, however, depends on the choices of individual States.
A State may possess the legal authority to investigate an alleged perpetrator but decide not to do
so. Another State may investigate because the suspect happens to reside within its territory. A
third may decline because of insufficient evidence, diplomatic considerations or limited
resources.
Consequently, geography does not disappear under universal jurisdiction. It simply changes its
form.
The question is no longer only where was the crime committed?
It becomes:
Where does the suspect live? Where can evidence be obtained? Which prosecutor is willing
to act? Which victims have access to justice? And which political circumstances make
prosecution possible?
That is why universal jurisdiction can simultaneously be a tool against impunity and a system
vulnerable to selectivity.
The numbers tell an encouraging story, but not the whole story
The development of universal jurisdiction should not, however, be dismissed as merely
symbolic.
The Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review 2026, covering developments during 2025, recorded
34 new cases opened or made public and 23 convictions in proceedings involving
international crimes. The review examined cases across 20 countries and found continuing use of
universal and other forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
These figures matter.
They demonstrate that universal jurisdiction is no longer merely an abstract principle discussed
in textbooks. It is being used in real investigations and trials.
The Syrian cases are particularly significant. In Germany alone, proceedings have continued
against alleged members of ISIS and other actors, including cases involving war crimes, crimes
against humanity and genocide.
There is therefore a strong argument that universal jurisdiction is becoming an important
component of the international accountability architecture.
Yet numbers alone cannot answer the question of fairness.
A system can produce convictions and still be selective.
Selectivity does not necessarily mean illegitimacy
It would be too easy to conclude that selectivity automatically makes universal jurisdiction
illegitimate.
International criminal justice has always operated within political and practical constraints. The
International Criminal Court itself faces jurisdictional limitations, questions of State cooperation
and the reality that arrest warrants are meaningless if States refuse to execute them.
The ICC's recent practice demonstrates the continuing importance of national and international
jurisdiction working alongside one another. In April 2026, the ICC Appeals Chamber confirmed
its jurisdiction in the Duterte case, holding that the Court could exercise jurisdiction over alleged
crimes committed in the Philippines during the period in which the country was a State Party to
the Rome Statute.
Similarly, in July 2026, the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed jurisdiction in the El Hishri case
concerning Libya.
These developments illustrate an important reality: international criminal justice is not governed
by one institution.
The ICC, domestic courts, UN investigative mechanisms, regional institutions and civil society
organisations increasingly operate as parts of a broader accountability ecosystem.
Universal jurisdiction therefore should not be judged against the unrealistic expectation that it
can prosecute every international crime.
Its value may instead lie in ensuring that some crimes do not remain entirely unpunished
merely because the primary jurisdiction has failed.
The danger of double standards
Nevertheless, the problem of double standards cannot be ignored.
International criminal law frequently speaks in universal terms. The prohibition of torture is
universal. The prohibition of genocide is universal. War crimes are prohibited regardless of the
nationality of the perpetrator.
But enforcement remains profoundly uneven.
This creates a legitimacy problem.
If individuals from weaker or politically isolated States are more frequently prosecuted than
individuals connected to powerful States, victims may reasonably ask whether international
criminal law is genuinely universal or merely selectively universal.
The credibility of international criminal justice depends not only on whether prosecutions occur,
but also on whether the underlying principles are applied consistently.
A system of justice that is powerful against the powerless but cautious towards the powerful
risks losing the moral authority on which international criminal law ultimately depends.
This is particularly important because universal jurisdiction is sometimes criticised as an
instrument of political interference. Such criticism should not simply be dismissed. States
exercising universal jurisdiction must ensure that prosecutions are based on credible evidence,
independent prosecutorial decisions and fair-trial guarantees rather than political objectives.
Universal jurisdiction cannot become a mechanism through which domestic courts substitute
political preferences for legal standards.
What should be done?
The answer is not to abandon universal jurisdiction.
On the contrary, it should be strengthened, but accompanied by greater consistency and
transparency.
First, States should adopt clear domestic legislation defining the international crimes that can be
prosecuted and the conditions under which universal jurisdiction may be exercised.
Second, prosecutors should develop transparent criteria for prioritising cases. Victim
participation, gravity of the alleged crimes, availability of evidence, the position of the suspect
and the possibility of a fair trial should all be relevant considerations.
Third, States should cooperate more systematically in collecting and preserving evidence.
International investigative mechanisms such as the UN International, Impartial and Independent
Mechanism have demonstrated the importance of preserving evidence that may eventually be
used before national courts. Recent Syrian proceedings have benefited from such international
investigative support.
Finally, universal jurisdiction should remain connected to the rights of victims.
The purpose of international criminal justice is not simply to obtain convictions. Victims should
be able to participate meaningfully, understand proceedings and obtain recognition of the harm
they suffered. Recent reforms in Germany, including measures designed to improve access to
proceedings for non-German-speaking communities, demonstrate how domestic courts can
incorporate a more survivor-centred approach into international criminal trials.
Beyond the courtroom
Universal jurisdiction ultimately represents something larger than a particular jurisdictional
doctrine.
It is a statement that certain crimes are too serious to be treated as purely domestic matters.
But international law should be careful not to confuse universal values with universal
enforcement.
The existence of a legal principle does not guarantee its equal application. Universal jurisdiction
will remain vulnerable to criticism so long as its practical operation depends heavily on where
suspects happen to travel, which States have the political will to investigate and which victims
can successfully bring evidence before prosecutors.
The solution, however, is not to retreat into territorialism.
That would risk returning international criminal law to precisely the problem universal
jurisdiction was designed to confront: impunity created by borders.
The better approach is to make universal jurisdiction more consistent, more transparent and more
victim-centred.
The real test of universal jurisdiction is therefore not whether every perpetrator will be
prosecuted.
That is an impossible standard.
The real test is whether international law can gradually transform the idea that “no jurisdiction”
means “no justice” into something that is no longer acceptable.
Universal jurisdiction may never produce a perfectly equal system of international criminal
justice. But when properly exercised, it can ensure that borders do not become permanent shields
for those accused of the gravest crimes.
And perhaps that is its most important promise:
not universal prosecution, but a universal rejection of impunity.
Selected authorities
1. Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal),
Judgment, ICJ Reports 2012.
2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998.
3. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 1984.
4. Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review 2026, reporting developments during 2025.
5. The Prosecutor v Rodrigo Roa Duterte, ICC Appeals Chamber, Judgment on jurisdiction,
22 April 2026.
6. The Prosecutor v Khaled Mohamed Ali El Hishri, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on
jurisdiction, 15 July 2026.


